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We revisit the twin deficit relationship for a sample of 193 countries over the period 1980-2016, 
using a panel fixed effect (within-group) estimator, bias-corrected least-squares dummy 
variable, system GMM, and common correlated effects pooled estimation procedures. The 
analysis accounts also for the existence of fiscal rules in place, their features, and their 
interaction with the budget balance. In the absence of fiscal rules, the twin deficit hypothesis is 
confirmed. The size of the estimated coefficient on the budget balance is between 0.68 and 0.79. 
However, the existence of fiscal rules strongly reduces the effect of budget balance on the 
current account balance (the coefficient is reduced to 0.1). In fact, the twin deficits relationship  
does not hold with some specific kinds of rules: debt rules, rules with monitoring of compliance, 
as well as budget balance rules and debt rules in emerging market economies and lowest income 
countries, and in the post-crisis period. 
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 Global imbalances along with fiscal consolidation in the aftermath of the Global 
Financial Crisis and the Great Recession have rekindled the literature about the twin deficits 
hypothesis: do fiscal deficits cause external deficits? Results from recent empirical studies are 
not conclusive. The sign and size of the effect of budget balance changes on external balances 
vary substantially across studies. The introduction of some other relevant factors among the 
determinants of external balances may reduce much or even counteract the impact of budget 
deficits on external deficits.  
Determining whether the twin deficits hypothesis holds or not is an important issue, 
because fiscal consolidation may help bring about a reduction in current account deficits if the 
hypothesis holds for some countries (Bluedorn and Leigh, 2011; Trachanas and Katrakilidis, 
2013; Litsios and Pilbeam, 2017) but it is not a panacea if the hypothesis is not confirmed for 
all countries (Corsetti and Müller, 2016; Algieri, 2013; Afonso, Rault and Estay, 2013). In the 
latter case, fiscal consolidation could be uneccessarily painful for some countries.  
Badinger et al. (2017) investigate the role of fiscal rules in the relationship between 
fiscal and external balances. Their results confirm the twin deficits hypothesis. They find that 
fiscal rules do not have any direct effect on the current account balance but their interaction 
with budget balances reduces the impact of the latter on the current account balance. In 
particular, debt rules reduce this impact in industrialised countries whereas budget balance rules 
do so in non-industrialised countries.  
In this paper, we want to reconsider the role of fiscal rules in the twin deficits hypothesis. 
Indeed, the use of fiscal rules has become widespread, but their features and strict enforcement 
have been diverse across countries (Schaechter et al., 2012). Our work is close to that of 
Badinger et al. (2017). Our contribution is to revisit the role of fiscal rules by considering other 
types of fiscal rules, in particular expenditure rules and revenue rules, as well as procedural 
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rules such as monitoring of compliance with the rule, enforcement of compliance with the rule 
and the existence of a fiscal council. We also use a large dataset covering 193 countries and a 
long period of time with recent years (1980-2016). 
Our mains findings are as follows: i) The size of the estimated coefficient of the budget 
balance, in the current account balance estimation, is between 0.68 and 0.79, which is in line 
with the other recent results, as discussed below in the review of the literature, and confirms 
the twin deficits hypothesis. ii) The oil balance is the second (along with the budget balance) 
most robust determinant of the current account (CA) balance, being strongly significant across 
all specifications. iii) The net foreign assets-to-GDP ratio increases the current account balance 
only if country fixed effects are omitted. iv) The old age dependency ratio improves the current 
account balance, thus suggesting that older societies tend to save more. v) The interaction 
between the existence of fiscal rules and the budget balance is positive and then an improvement 
in the budget balance leads to an improvement of the current account balance. vi) Expenditure 
rules have a positive impact on the CA balance, while revenue rules do not have any influence. 
vii) The existence of an enforcement mechanism of a fiscal rule exerts a positive effect on the 
current account. All in all, in this case, the main conclusion is that the twin deficit hypothesis 
no longer holds when there are debt rules, rules with monitoring of compliance, budget balance 
rules or debt rules in emerging market economies and lowest income countries, and these rules 
over the post-crisis period.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. The following section outlines the theoretical framework. Section 4 details the 
econometric methodology adopted and presents the underlying data together with some stylized 





In this section we briefly review recent empirical studies on the twin deficits hypothesis. 
Another related literature deals with the fundamental determinants of the current account. As 
long as the budget balance belongs to these factors, the results of empirical studies are useful 
to check the twin deficits hypothesis: a positive statistically significant estimated coefficient on 
the budget balance variable in an equation where the current account balance is the dependent 
variable can be interpreted as evidence supporting the hypthesis.1  
In previous studies where there was evidence for the twin deficits hypothesis, the 
coefficient of the relationship between the budget balance and the current account was typically 
positive and at most 0.30 as pointed out in Corsetti and Müller (2006), Bluedorn and Leigh 
(2011) or Holmes (2011). In recent works, the estimated coefficient is higher, around 0.50 or 
0.60 (Bluedorn and Leigh, 2011; Afonso et al., 2013; Badinger et al., 2017; Litsios and Pilbeam, 
2017). 
The twin deficits hypothesis used to be rejected in the case of the United States (Müller, 
2008; Grier and Ye, 2009). This is because the country is a large and relatively closed economy, 
and fiscal shocks are not persistent (Corsetti and Müller, 2006). A strong Ricardian effect 
(increase in private saving) and a crowding-out effect (decrease in private investment) are also 
found (Kim and Roubini, 2008). These works were based on a VAR analysis.2 However, recent 
empirical works have tried to address issues related to the existence of structural breaks or 
regime shifts. Accounting for threshold effects in a cointegration analysis with structural break, 
Holmes (2011) finds evidence of twin deficits in the case of large public deficits in the U.S. 
The long run coefficient is 0.42. Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2008) use a panel regression of the 
                                                          
1 For a review of earlier studies on twin deficits, see Algieri (2013), Afonso et al. (2013). For the determinants of 
the current account, see Barnes et al. (2010). Table A1 in the Appendix summarizes main findings of the recent 
literature. 
2 In some studies, a public spending shock rather than a government budget deficit shock is considered. On this 
account, the twin deficits hypothesis is rejected for the U.S. (Müller, 2008) but confirmed for a panel of 14 
European Union (EU) countries (Beetsma et al., 2008). 
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current account on several determinants, and a threshold of the government debt-to-GDP ratio. 
They find that the twin deficit hypothesis holds for 22 indutrialised countries up to a 
government debt-to-GDP ratio of 90% (80% for 11-euro area countries). Above this threshold, 
Ricardian equivalence is likely to prevail.  
For European countries, and especially countries with large internal and external 
imbalances (among which Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), evidence of twin deficits 
is mixed: on the one hand, the hypothesis is rejected in Algieri (2013) who uses Granger 
causality tests; on the other hand, the hypothesis is confirmed for Greece, Portugal and Spain 
in Trachanas and Katrakilidis (2013) who take into account non linearities (but the primary 
budget balance is used instead of the overall balance), and in Litsios and Pilbeam (2017) who 
use a cointegration analysis.  
More recently, Badinger et al. (2017) tested for the effect of fiscal rules on the 
relationship between the budget balance and the current account balance for a panel of 73 
countries over the period 1985-2012. Their results confirm the twin deficits hypothesis (with 
an estimated coefficient around 0.20). The estimated coefficient of the budget balance remains 
positive and statistically significant when a fiscal rule variable and the interaction of a fiscal 
rule variable with the budget balance are introduced among regressors. They find that fiscal 
rules have not any direct effects on the current account balance but they have an indirect 
negative effect (via the interaction term with the budget balance). This conclusion holds both 
for budget balance rules and debt rules. However, results differ if the sample is split between 
industrialised countries and non-industrialised countries: for the former, the twin deficits 





3. Theoretical framework 
We can recall the standard macro identity: 
 Y C I G X M= + + + −  (1) 
where C is private consumption expenditure, I is private investment, G is government 
expenditure, X is exports of goods and services, M is imports of goods and services. Hence, 
private saving S stems from disposable income net of consumption expenditure, and taxes 
 S Y C T= − −  (2) 
where T is tax revenue. From (1) and (2) we obtain the current account (CA) balance, the 
difference between national investment and national saving, which in turn is the sum of private 
and public saving: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )X M S I T G− = − + −  (3) 
 ( )CA S I BUD= − +  (4) 
and the current account (CA=X-M) balance is related to the budget balance (BUD=T-G) through 
the difference between private saving and investment. From the above relationships, it is clear 
that private domestic saving and foreign capital inflow (current account deficit), are in fact the 
financing sources of both private investment and government budget deficits. 
When the government incurs a budget deficit (T-G<0) this may be financed in various 
ways. For instance, it may be financed by the private sector (S>I), with the government issuing 
public debt.. Therefore, a government deficit needs not imply a current account deficit. On the 
other hand, in the presence of a budget surplus and a current account deficit, there would be 
increases in private investment and/or decreasing private saving (implying S<I). 
Under the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, a decrease in taxes leaves the current 
account balance unaffected if consumers save more to help pay expected higher future taxes. 
There could be an effect of the fiscal shock on the current account balance though depending 
on the degree to which the private sector is liquidity constrained. Note that during recessions, a 
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budget deficit does not necessarily lead to a current account deficit if the increase in net private 
saving – due to a fall in private investment – is larger than the decrease in net public saving.  
When both the public and the private sectors are in a deficit position, then this will be 
reflected in a current account deficit (X-M<0). Such an overall shortfall in domestic saving may 
then be financed by foreign capital inflows, in the form of investments in either domestic public 
debt or the domestic private sector. This would imply a surplus position in the capital account 
(KA>0) and the accumulation of foreign reserves, R. 
 R CA KA= +  (5) 
Therefore, if the difference between private saving and investment remains stable, a 
budget deficit impinges negatively on the current account balance. Overall, this could imply 
that shocks to the fiscal position may push the current account balance in the same direction, 
the main point of the twin-deficits argument. However, investment and saving decisions are 
bound to change given the fiscal deficit, while the effect of fiscal policy on the current account 
should also depend on the size and the trade exposure of the country. Still evident from equation 
(4), is that with a given level of saving an increase in the budget deficit will either crowd out 
private investment or attract additional inflows of capital. In this respect, Corsetti and Müller 
(2006) show, in a New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) model, that the twin deficits 
hypothesis is likely to hold for economies that are more open and with more persistent fiscal 
shocks. Indeed, they stress the importance of the terms of trade channel that can counterbalance 
the crowding-out effect of fiscal deficits on private investment.3    
In the context of a simple Fleming-Mundell open economy framework, one can recall 
that with international capital movements and flexible exchange rates, a fiscal expansion could 
lead to higher interest rates, and in the presence of capital inflows an appreciation of the 
                                                          
3 The increase in prices of domestic goods relative to prices of imported goods raises the rate of return to capital 
(much in an economy where the import content of investment is high), and as a consequence, private investment 
increases (more so if the shock is more persistent and the improvement in the terms of trade lasts longer).  
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domestic currency may occur which could increase the current account deficit.4 In theory, in 
the case of perfect capital mobility, with capital flowing among countries to equalise the yield 
to investors, the current account deficit could increase by exactly the same amount as the budget 
deficit.5 On the other hand, while a fiscal expansion can drive the current account into deficit, 
the resulting eventual higher interest rates can push the capital account into surplus. Therefore, 
the final effect on foreign reserves accumulation is less clear, and depends on the relative 
sensitivity of international capital flows and on the responsiveness of imports to income. In 
addition, the appreciation of the currency may improve the current account balance in the short 
term (through lower import prices) and worsen it with a delay (J-Curve effect). As a result, the 
contemporaneous impact of a budget deficit may not be a current account deficit.6  
The existence of fiscal policy rules may affect the relationship between the budget 
balance and the current account balance. Twin deficits are unlikely to be observed under a 
balanced budget rule. However, as discussed in Badinger et al. (2017), there are various (direct 
and indirect) effects, and the overall effect might be ambiguous. First, if economic agents 
consider that the existence of fiscal rules reduces uncertainty, favors sound public finances and 
improves fiscal sustainability, then the need for precautionary saving is reduced. In such a case, 
we would expect a negative effect of stringent fiscal rules on the current account balance. 
Second, stricter fiscal rules might bring about lower interest rates. The effect on the current 
account is uncertain, because there would be a decrease in capital inflows and a depreciation of 
the currency, but there would also be an increase in domestic spending. Finally, stricter fiscal 
rules induce stronger Ricardian equivalence and this reduces the effect of the budget balance 
                                                          
4 Dornbusch (1976) showed that the interest rate is a key factor between the adjustments of the domestic economy 
and of the current account. 
5 With perfect capital mobility, fiscal policy cannot restore the internal balance (Mundell, 1963). 
6 In Müller (2008), a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model is built in order to explain why a positive 
government spending shock increases net exports in the case of the United States. His theoretical result stems from 
a balanced government budget (higher public spending is financed by taxes), a fall in private spending, and a 
nominal currency depreciation. 
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on the current account balance. Agents expect that the government will correct the budget 
deficit in the future, if the fiscal rules make it compulsory to do so. Consequently, they save 
more in order to pay future higher taxes. The decrease in public saving is thus associated with 
an increase in private saving.  
4. Econometric Methodology and Data Issues 
4.1 Panel Analysis 
We first re-estimate the typical specification used in empirical studies on the twin deficits 
(Lee et al, 2008; Prat et al., 2010; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2012) using a larger dataset with 
more cross-sectional observations and a more recent period. Equation (6) below shows our 
baseline reduced-form empirical model on the determinants of the current account: 
 
, ,
1 2 3 4' [ * ]
FR BF FR BF
it t i it it it it it itCA BB FI FI BBδ γ α α α α ε= + + + + + +X  (6) 
where itCA is the current account balance in percent of GDP, itBB is the government budget 
balance in percent of GDP, itX  is a vector of control variables and itFI  is a proxy for fiscal 
institution, which can comprise of “FR” that is fiscal rules, or “BF” that is budgetary 
frameworks; ,t iδ γ  denote time and country effects, respectively. itε is a disturbance term 
satisfying standard conditions of zero mean and constant variance.  
The control variables are chosen among fundamental determinants of the current account 
balance (Lee et al., 2008; Barnes et al., 2010). The latter explain why national saving may 
exceed or fall short of national investment. Apart from the budget balance (see supra), the 
relevant variables are the following: 
• A higher age dependency ratio is expected to decrease the current account balance. 
Indeed, a high share of young and old (inactive) people in total population is likely to 
increase current consumption relative to income. However, an ageing population would 
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save more today in order to smooth consumption over time. The effect of old age 
dependency is not settled because saving behavior depends on the pension system.  
• The population growth rate has a negative effect on the current account balance as long 
as it leads to higher consumption (given the increasing share of young people).  
• GDP growth is expected to have a negative impact on the current account balance. This 
effect depends on the import intensity of aggregate demand components.  It also depends 
on whether economic agents perceive the increase in income as being temporary or 
permanent.  
• GDP per capita has a positive impact on the current account balance. In the early stage of 
economic development, a country needs to borrow abroad because the national saving 
rate is too low to finance investment. In contrast, rich countries can afford to lend to the 
rest of the world. This effect can be captured by relative income, which is a country’s 
GDP per capita relative to the U.S. level. 
• Net foreign assets have a positive effect on the current account balance if the country has 
a net creditor position (it receives net investment income).   
• Oil balance is generally preferred to oil prices as a control variable because the latter 
affect countries differently depending on whether they are producer/exporting or 
importing countries. A positive oil balance helps improve the current account balance. 
Equation (6) is first estimated using a panel fixed effect (within-group) estimator — this 
will serve as our baseline. In some occasions, for sensitivity, country and/or time effects may 
be dropped. In addition, in some specifications, the interaction term may be absent. 
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As robustness checks we also employ alternative estimators. More specifically, Equation 
(6) is also estimated using the bias-corrected least-squares dummy variable (LSDV-C) 
estimator by Bruno (2005).7   
Moreover, the model described above is reduced-form and does not allow making causal 
statements or even quantifying the clean effect of deflation on fiscal policy aggregates, meaning 
that the use of instruments is required. While adding covariates present in our vector itX  partly 
corrects for these biases, endogeneity can still arise from other omitted variables (unobserved 
heterogeneity and selection effects), measurement errors in variables and reverse causality 
(simultaneity). Since causality can run in both directions, some of the right-hand-side regressors 
may be correlated with the error term.  
In addition, the first-differenced Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator can 
behave poorly if time series are persistent. Hence, we use the more efficient system GMM 
estimator that exploits stationarity restrictions. This method jointly estimates Equation (6) in 
first differences, using as instruments lagged levels of the dependent and independent variables, 
and in levels, using as instruments the first differences of the regressors (Arellano and Bover, 
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).8 GMM estimators are unbiased, and compared with ordinary 
least squares or fixed effects (within-group) estimators, exhibit the smallest bias and variance 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). As far as information on the choice of lagged levels (differences) 
used as instruments in the difference (level) equation, as work by Bowsher (2002) and, more 
recently, Roodman (2009) have indicated, when it comes to moment conditions (as thus to 
instruments) more is not always better. The GMM estimators are likely to suffer from 
                                                          
7 Kiviet (1995) used asymptotic expansion techniques to approximate the small sample bias of the standard LSDV 
estimator for samples where N is small or only moderately large. Bruno (2005) extended the bias approximation 
formulas to accommodate unbalanced panels with a strictly exogenous selection rule. 
8 We equally tried estimating Equation (6) with a difference GMM estimator but decided against it because the 
lagged dependent variable was not significant. Moreover, the tenor of the results is very similar to the system 
GMM. More specifically, we run the two-step system-GMM estimator with Windmeijer standard errors. The 
significance of the results is robust to different choices of instruments and predetermined variables. 
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“overfitting bias” once the number of instruments approaches (or exceeds) the number of 
groups/countries (as a simple rule of thumb). In the present case, the validity of instruments 
was examined using Sargan’s test of overidentifying restrictions. Intuitively, the system GMM 
estimator does not rely exclusively on the first-differenced equations, but exploits also 
information contained in the original equations in levels. 
We also rely on the Pesaran (2006) common correlated effects pooled (CCEP) estimator 
that accounts for the presence of unobserved common factors by including cross-section 
averages of the dependent and independent variables in the regression equation, and where the 
averages are interacted with country-dummies to allow for country-specific parameters. This 
estimator is a generalization of the fixed effects estimator that allows for the possibility of cross 
section correlation. Including the (weighted) cross sectional averages of the dependent variable 
and individual specific regressors is suggested by Pesaran (2006, 2007, 2009) as an effective 
way to filter out the impacts of common factors, which could be common technological shocks 
or macroeconomic shocks, causing between group error dependence. 
Finally, we inspect the potential role played by outliers in our sample using the Method of 
Moments that fits the efficient high breakdown estimator proposed by Yohai (1987). In the first 
stage it takes the S estimator, a high breakdown value method introduced in Rousseeuw and 
Yohai (1984) applied to the residual scale. It then derives starting values for the coefficient 
vectors, and on the second stage applies the Huber-type bi-square M-estimator using iteratively 
re-weighted least squares (IRWLS) to obtain the final coefficient estimates. We also account 
for outliers and trimmed the sample to extreme values of the dependent variable, which is we 
exclude similarly to Badinger et al. (2017), current account values above 15 percent of GDP in 
absolute value. 
4.2 Data and Stylized Facts 
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Our sample, for which the macro data come from the IMF World Economic Outlook 
database, covers 193 countries observed over the period 1980-2016, which yields up to a 
maximum of 7141 observations. However, the data availability restrains that number to 3858 
points for the current account balance (as a share of GDP) and 2894 for the budget balance 
(with the common sample of 2878 observations). Given the selection of the variables following 
the procedure proposed by Raftery (1995) the sample size for the baseline model is further 
reduced to 2329, which is still more than satisfactory for the purposes of our analysis. The 
detailed descriptive statistics as well as the correlation table are presented in the Appendix 
(Tables A2 and A3). With the full cross-sectional dimension taken into account, the correlation 
between the budget balance and the current account balance is very high and relatively 
insensitive to the selection of the time frame: it assumes values between 0.55 and 0.63.  
For individual countries, however, such correlation is not necessarily very robust. This may 
be illustrated by the inspection of Figure 1, depicting current account balance and budget 
balance for four selected countries: Canada, France and Japan among developed countries, 
Bangladesh as an example of a developing one, Poland – a transition economy – and Portugal, 
a country that suffered from the euro area crisis.  
One may notice, that for Canada the relation seems to be quite stable, especially over the 
period 1990-2010 (with the corresponding correlation coefficient reaching 0.86, whereas for 
the whole period it is somewhat lower and stands at 0.58). Interestingly, it turns out to be even 
negative for the pre-NAFTA (pre-1994) period and attains 0.65 since then.  
For France in spite of a parallel pattern, the correlation is much weaker than for the whole 
panel (although still positive) and reaches 0.24. If the French experience is splitted into pre-
crisis and post-crisis period, both correlation coefficients are very close to zero (and 
insignificant). On the other hand, during pre-euro years (until 1998) the correlation was 
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negative (-0.29) and after the creation of the common currency it turns positive and reaches 
0.68.  
[Figure 1] 
Moreover, the post-crisis period is associated with the return to the twin-deficit pattern in 
Poland and Portugal, although arguably for different reasons. In Portugal, it seemingly reflected 
an exogenous external and internal adjustment and the return to close-to-balance values for both 
current account and budget deficits, whereas in Poland the adjustment is probably driven by a 
longer run improvement in competitiveness (successful catching-up in productivity). 
Interestingly, in the pre-crisis period the correlation between the current account and the budget 
balance for Poland was strongly negative (-0.65), which could be explained by the inflow of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (contributing to private investment and allowing for an easy 
financing of the current account deficits).  
Japan exhibits an overall weak relationship between current account balance and budget 
balance, and some comovement could be observed only until mid-1990s and (to a smaller 
extent) also in the post-crisis environment. This can be contrasted with the experience of 
Bangladesh, which has a virtually nil correlation between the current account balance and the 
budget balance since the crisis, and the highest one (of order of 0.6) for the subperiod between 
1980 and 2000. It might suggest that Bangladesh was relatively cut out of international 
financing until 2000 and enjoys opportunities of international risk sharing (and consumption 
smoothing) since then, which is exemplified by the increases in FDI inflow in the early 2000s.  
Therefore, these differences across individual countries call for an extensive empirical 
investigation. For instance, the French experience might suggest that implementation of some 
kind of fiscal rule (related to Stability and Growth Pact) might influence the twin deficit 
relationship. Thus, a comprehensive set of results will be presented and commented in the 
following section.  
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In particular, in order to study the impact of different fiscal rules as well as their specificities 
and interactions with budget balance on the current account balance we utilize three datasets 
created by the IMF. The first one was introduced by Schaechter et al. (2012) and its most recent 
available update, containing data for 96 countries over the period 1985-2015 is discussed in 
detail by Lledó et al. (2017). The rules are classified according to the following typology: 
expenditure rules (ER), revenue rules (RR), budget balance rules (BBR) and debt rules (DR). 
Additionally, we created a dummy variable FR_1, denoting existence of any of these fiscal rules 
in a given country in a given year. Moreover, the dataset contains information on such features 
of the rules as existing escape clauses, enforcement procedures or independent monitoring 
councils or their transparency. In the analysis, we include 65 countries, which had at least one 
of the rules in place during the period of analysis. Overall, during the 31 years of the timespan 
at least one rule in place was observed in 1076 cases (on 2015 possible), the most frequent 
being the budget balance rule (974 cases), followed by debt rule (772 occurrences), expenditure 
rule (399), the least frequent being the revenue rule (186). Only a handful of countries 
(Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore) had at least one rule in place for the 
entire time span. In all of these cases, it was the balanced budget rule, additionally completed 
by an expenditure rule (for Germany) and debt rule (in Malaysia). If a given rule was in place, 
the debt rule was present in a given country for almost 16.5 years, balanced budget rule for 15.7 
years, revenue rule for 13.3 years (but it was present only in 13 countries) and expenditure rule 
for 9.7 years.  
The dataset additionally contains information about monitoring, enforcement and escape 
clause for each type of rules. We utilize this data on somewhat more aggregate level, i.e., if any 
of the fiscal rules applied in a country had a monitoring of compliance in place, the variable 
FR_monitor assumes value 1 and zero otherwise. The same is the case for formal enforcement 
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procedure and escape clauses whereas independent monitoring body and transparency are taken 
“as they are” from the database.  
At least one of these institutions is in place at least for one year in 48 out of 65 countries. 
The most frequent and relatively persistent is enforcement mechanism, which is in place in 28 
countries on average for slightly more than 10 years. Marginally least popular is monitoring 
(25 countries, on average in place for 9.6 years), Transparency requirements are present in 21 
countries, notably on average for the longest period, i.e. for almost 11 years. Independent 
monitoring body is in place in 22 countries, but as a relatively recent mechanism, its average 
duration only slightly exceeds 5 years. Finally, some form of escape clause is present in 12 
countries, on average for 7.5 years.  
Another dataset we utilize was made available by Gupta and Yläoutinen (2014). They 
analyse fiscal institutional framework, in G-20 economies completed by six low-income 
countries (Kenya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Uganda, Vietnam and Zambia). In particular, 
features under scrutiny are fiscal reporting (fr), macro fiscal forecasting (mf), independent fiscal 
agency (ifa), fiscal objectives (fo), medium term budget framework (mbf), budget execution 
(be), understanding the scale and scope of the fiscal challenge (understanding), developing a 
credible fiscal strategy (developing) and implementing the fiscal strategy through the budget 
process (implementing). Except for ifa, which is present only in 17 out of the 26 countries, all 
of these institutions are to a smaller or larger extent present in at least 24 countries. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Baseline 
We start with estimating a series of baseline models, where we use the full sample with 
different combinations of the variables suggested by the literature and we test the robustness of 
the results to the inclusion of country and time fixe effects (Table 1). The key variable, the 
budget balance, turns out to be a very important determinant of the current account balance and 
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this is robust result to different specifications. More precisely, we find that the size of the 
estimated coefficient on budget balance is between 0.68 and 0.79, which is in line with the other 
recent results, as discussed above, and confirms the twin deficits hypothesis.  
[Table 1] 
The other significant determinants include in particular age dependency ratios. Young 
age dependency exerts the expected and robust effect on the current account: a higher share of 
youth in population leads to worsening of the current account. The influence of the old age 
dependency ratio, theoretically being uncertain (potentially increasing either consumption or 
savings), is empirically found to improve current account balance – thus suggesting that older 
societies tend to save more. The effect is stronger in terms of absolute value than the one of the 
young age dependency, but somewhat less robust: in the series of estimates without fixed effects 
it is significant only if the young age dependency ratio is not included. 
The ratio of net foreign assets (NFA) to GDP is positive (as expected) and significant 
only if country fixed effects are omitted. This might be implied by the fact that NFA tends to 
change slowly over time and thus country fixed effects could capture its influence.  
Population growth, somewhat unexpectedly, exerts a robustly positive, although not 
very strongly significant, effect on the current account balance (CAB). A one percent increase 
in population would lead to ca. 0.6 percent improvement of the CAB. This can be contrasted 
with the lack of influence of economic growth on the CAB in the baseline estimations.  
FDI inflow impacts the CAB negatively (as expected) only if country fixed effects are 
included. This might be implied by the fact that in the whole sample countries enjoying a better 
CAB possibly attract more FDI on average, whereas the true effect is visible after we control 
for country specificities.  
Oil balance is the second (along with the budget balance) most robust determinant of 
the CAB: it is strongly significant across all specifications, but quantitatively much stronger 
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once fixed effects are included. Finally, terms of trade seem to affect the CAB positively despite 
weak statistical significance.  
5.2. Fiscal rules 
These baseline results constitute a benchmark for our subsequent, core empirical results. 
Table 2 presents the results of estimates including the same set of current account determinants 
as in Table 1, completed by dummies related to the existence of fiscal rules in place and the 
interaction of each kind of rules with the budget balance. This set of results can be summarized 
as follows. First, the size and, in some cases the significance, of the incidence of budget balance 
on the CA falls, which may be, at least to some extent, implied by a smaller sample size due to 
availability of data on fiscal rules. It is also in line with some theoretical considerations: the 
existence of fiscal rules may well increase the likelihood of Ricardian equivalence and thus 
reduce the influence of the budget balance on the current account balance. In this configuration, 
the impact of one percentage point improvement of budget balance is on average reduced to 
only 0.1 pp. improvement in the CA.  
[Table 2] 
The impact of age dependency ratios is also strongly reduced, in terms of both size and 
significance. However, the impact (if any) of young age dependency remains negative and old 
age dependency – positive. Interestingly, in this setup the impact of NFA to GDP ratio is 
positive and significant, of the order 0.03 pp. improvement of the CA balance for each 
percentage point of higher NFA to GDP ratio. This could be interpreted in terms of net primary 
income generated by NFA (rate of return on NFA being on average of 3%), which confirms the 
underlying intuitions.  
In this set of results also population growth and economic growth turn out to exert the 
expected (negative) effect on the CA, the former with elasticity close to 0.9 and the latter of 
0.15 (a 1% increase in population worsens the current account to GDP ratio by ca. 0.9%, 
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whereas a 1% increase in nominal GDP worsens it by 0.15%). Both quantitative and qualitative 
impact of FDI inflow and oil balance remains unchanged with respect to baseline results 
including fixed effects (negative in the former case and positive in the latter), terms of trade 
being systematically insignificant.  
As for the direct effects of fiscal rules on the CA and their indirect effects (via their 
interaction with the budget balance variable), we find that the impact of the existence of fiscal 
rules in general turns out to be negative (columns 1 and 2 of table 2), but the interaction between 
the existence of fiscal rules and budget balance is positive. This would suggest that if a fiscal 
rule is in place, an improvement of budget balance leads to an improvement of the CA. This 
more than offsets the lack of significance of budget balance incidence on the CA in model (2).  
As for expenditure rules (models 3 and 4) its very existence matters and has a positive 
impact on the CA balance (interaction term is not significant and the coefficient of the budget 
balance itself does not change dramatically when ER is included in the estimations). On the 
other hand, revenue rules do not have any influence, neither alone nor as an interaction term. 
The impact of the balanced budget rule (BBR) (models 7 and 8) is identical  to the existence of 
a fiscal rule in general: the rule alone has a negative impact but including interaction term leads 
to insignificant  coefficients of the budget balance, which is more than offset by the interaction 
between the BBR and the budget balance. The existence of a debt rule, on the contrary, has a 
negative impact on the CA and including the interaction term (itself insignificant) makes the 
BB coefficient insignificant, too. Hence, having fiscal rules in place matters for the relationship 
between the budget balance and the current account balance, particularly regarding balance 
budget rules (via an interaction effect). In contrast to Badinger et al. (2017), we thus find that 
the budget balance rules and debt rules have negative direct effects on the current account 
balance. In addition, we find that expenditure rules have positive effects whereas revenue rules 
have not any effects.   
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Table 3 presents the results of estimations aiming at a more detailed inspection of 
specific characteristics of fiscal rules: their monitoring and the independence of this monitoring 
process, enforcement, and the existence of escape clauses and transparency. This set of results, 
in terms of macroeconomic determinants (control variables) does not materially differ from the 
ones presented in Table 2 above, which is implied by a very comparable sample size and 
country coverage. The only important quantitative change is that the coefficient on budget 
balance becomes stronger, of the order of 0.16 – 0.2, depending on the specification.  
[Table 3] 
 
Monitoring compliance of the fiscal rules in place does not seem to matter directly, but 
its interaction with the budget balance exerts a negative impact on the current account. This 
might be interpreted in the following way: monitoring compliance makes fiscal shocks less 
persistent and ultimately the link between fiscal position and current account becomes a “twin 
divergence” rather than twin deficit (models 1 and 2 in Table 3). An almost exactly opposite 
interpretation may be given to the existence of enforcement mechanism of a fiscal rule: such 
enforcement exerts a positive effect on the current account, without any interaction with the 
budget balance (models 3 and 4). Unsurprisingly, escape clause exercises the effect directly 
opposite to monitoring – it is not significant itself, but strengthens twin deficit via interaction 
term, which is arguably implied by potentially increasing effect of an escape clause on the 
persistence of the fiscal shocks (models 5 and 6). Independent monitoring does not seem to 
have a direct influence (model 7), but once the interaction term is included it improves the 
current account balance both by its existence (more strongly and less significantly) and by the 
interaction term (less strongly but more significantly), which strengthens the twin deficit 
pattern. Finally, transparency of a fiscal rule is associated with a worse current account balance, 
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but the interaction term weakens the relationship between the budget balance and the CA 
balance.  
Table 4 presents the results of the impact of a relatively novel dataset by Gupta and 
Ylaoutinen (2014) on the relationship between the budget balance and CA. Given a much 
smaller sample size restrained to G-20 economies, the results that we obtained for this exercise 
differ from those included in tables 2-3. First, the twin deficit pattern is much stronger (and 
depending on the exact specification): the direct impact of the budget balance on the CA balance 
is between 0.36 and as high as 1.13.  
Among dependency ratios the one related to the aging of the society is very high and 
significant (and robust, with coefficients of ca. 0.5) whereas the one related to youth is still 
negative and significant only at around 10%. The order of value of the NFA impact remains the 
same, but the significance falls to around 10% as well, whereas population and GDP growth 
rates are not significant at all.  
Interestingly, the FDI and the oil balance keep their size (respectively, around -0.55 and 
0.4) and very high statistical significance. Among G-20 countries the terms of trade reveal to 
be highly significant – an improvement of the terms of trade leads to the improvement of the 
CA balance with the estimated coefficient of 0.6.  
Regarding the fiscal institutional framework, in particular features such as fiscal 
reporting, macro fiscal forecasting, independent fiscal agency, fiscal objectives, medium term 
budget framework, budget execution, understanding the scale and scope of the fiscal challenge, 
developing a credible fiscal strategy and implementing the fiscal strategy through the budget 
process, our results indicate that they strongly matter for the development of the CA 
performance and can be summarized as follows. In general, all of the considered aspects of the 
fiscal institutional setup tend to worsen the CA balance directly and weaken the relationship 
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between BB and CA (via interaction term). The only exception is “budget execution”, which 
strongly improves CA balance and has no impact via the interaction with the budget balances.  
[Table 4] 
5.3. Robustness 
Table 5 breaks the sample down into three groups of countries: advanced economies 
(AE), emerging market economies (EME) and low-income countries (LIC). It turns out that in 
general the twin deficit behaviour characterizes only AEs (and in specifications without the 
balance budget rule nor the debt rule) or LICs (only in the specification with expenditure rules). 
In advanced economies, the young age dependency ratio turns positive, which could be 
explained by the fact that rich societies tend to save for future education of young generations 
(are the only ones which can afford it). In addition, the old age dependency is only significant 
in AEs. The other results on control variables are roughly comparable with the ones presented 
in tables 2 and 3.  
[Table 5] 
Interesting, the results are also obtained differently for fiscal rules, per country group. 
In advanced economies, the mere existence of balanced budget rules and debt rules improves 
the CA balance. Among the interaction terms, the revenue rule exerts some “twin divergence” 
effect (albeit not significantly), whereas the balance budget rule and the debt rule strengthen 
the twin deficit behaviour.  
Among EMEs, the revenue rule is associated with a more positive CA balance and 
weakens the incidence of the budget balance on the current account (via the interaction effect), 
the balance budget rule worsens the current account and weakens the link between the budget 
balance and the CA whereas the debt rule does not have any direct impact on current account 
but also leads to “twin divergence” (again, likely because of decreased persistence of fiscal 
shocks). Among the LICs, such impact is generally weaker, only balanced budget rules and 
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debt rules have some negative impact on the CA balance whereas a positive interaction is only 
visible in the latter case.  
Overall, these results confirm that the twin deficit hypothesis does not hold when there 
are budget balance rules or debt rules in emerging market economies and lowest income 
countries.  
Table 6 reports the results of several robustness checks of the baseline model augmented 
by the existence of any fiscal rule and its interaction term with budget balance (equivalent to 
model 2 of table 2) applying different estimators and tools aiming at reducing the impact of 
outliers. The non-significance of the budget balance coefficient in this specification of the fixed 
effects panel model is confirmed by LSDV and CCEP estimators as well as for the exclusion 
of outliers with the absolute value of the current account exceeding 15% of GDP. On the other 
hand, the system GMM estimator finds the incidence of the budget balance on the CA to be a 
weak (0.075) but significant at 5%. The outlier-robust estimation (Rousseeuw and Yohai, 1984; 
Yohai, 1987) finds this key coefficient to be even higher (of the order of 0.2 and significant at 
1%). Significance of fiscal rule is detected only by this last method (at a higher significance but 
also with the opposite sign) and a positive interaction term of the budget balance with any fiscal 
rule is detected by system GMM, outlier-robust procedure and with the trimmed sample.  
Finally, Table 7 applies the same approaches to test the impact of fiscal rules and their 
interactions with the budget balance on the current account balance (this estimation should be 
compared to the “even” models of the table 2). It turns out that the direct impact of the fiscal 
rules as well as their interaction with budget balance are not veritably robust across different 
methodologies: LSDV does not find any significant impact of any of the rules, system GMM 
estimation only finds a positive interaction coefficient in the BBR, CCEP finds a positive 
impact of the ER and weakly positive impact of the interaction term as well as a negative impact 
of the debt rule both directly and via interaction. Outlier-robust procedure finds all rules 
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significant as well as their interaction terms (except for debt rule), with BBR and ER having 
positive impacts on CA, and RR and DR – negative ones. Trimming the outliers out of the 
sample leads to a positive interaction coefficient of the BBR (confirming the findings of table 
2, model 8) and positive and significant effects of ER and its interaction term (which is not in 
line with our baseline estimates).  
[Table 6] 
[Table 7] 
Additionally, we also tested if the results are robust to splitting the sample size after the 
introduction of the euro (which is equivalent to dividing the time span into two equal 
subsamples) and testing the twin deficit hypothesis in the pre- and post-crisis environment 
separately. These results are reported in the appendix – tables A4 and A5. The twin deficit 
hypothesis is confirmed only in the post-1999 or post-crisis periods, in specifications without 
the budget balance rule or the debt rule.  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have revisited the twin deficit relationship for a sample of 193 countries 
over the period 1980-2016, using a panel fixed effect (within-group) estimator, bias-corrected 
least-squares dummy variable, system GMM, and common correlated effects pooled estimation 
procedures. Our analysis accounts also for the existence of fiscal rules in place and the 
interaction of each rule with the budget balance.  
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: First, in the baseline estimation without 
any fiscal rules, the twin deficit hypothesis is confirmed with an estimated coefficient of the 
budget balance, in the current account balance equation, between 0.68 and 0.79, which is in line 
with other recent studies. Second, the inclusion of fiscal rules among the regressors reduces the 
direct effect of the budget balance on the current account balance (the estimated coefficient is 
reduced to about 0.1). Third, the interaction between the existence of fiscal rules and the budget 
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balance is positive so that an improvement in the budget balance leads to an improvement of 
the current account balance. Fourth, expenditure rules have a positive impact on the CA 
balance, while revenue rules do not have any influence. Fifth, the existence of an enforcement 
mechanism of a fiscal rule exerts a positive effect on the current account. Finally, we do find 
evidence of the twin deficit hypothesis when considering budget balance and debt rules, 
especially in emerging market economies and lowest income countries, and after the great 
financial crisis. In contrast, and not surprisingly, rules with escape clauses, which attenuate 
fiscal discipline, reinforce the twin deficits hypothesis.  
Overall, our results support the view that fiscal consolidation could be harmful without 
much benefit in terms of reducing external imbalances in countries that have implemented 
stringent fiscal rules.  
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Table 1. Baseline, alternative specifications, different country and time effects, all countries 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Regressors              
             
Bbalance 0.786*** 0.747*** 0.780*** 0.740*** 0.686*** 0.694*** 0.699*** 0.692*** 0.717*** 0.721*** 0.726*** 0.719*** 
 (0.133) (0.147) (0.139) (0.147) (0.173) (0.176) (0.177) (0.176) (0.171) (0.173) (0.174) (0.174) 
age_dep_young  -0.097***  -0.100***  -0.127***  -0.125***  -0.124***  -0.121*** 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
age_dep_old 0.273*** 0.020 0.197*** 0.024 0.172*** 0.198*** 0.243*** 0.205*** 0.215*** 0.196*** 0.123* 0.201*** 
 (0.064) (0.083) (0.064) (0.083) (0.055) (0.066) (0.065) (0.063) (0.068) (0.074) (0.067) (0.069) 
NFA_GDP 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.000 0.009 0.016 0.009 0.003 0.009 0.012 0.009 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
popgr 0.519 0.668* 0.585* 0.687* 0.632* 0.663** 0.665** 0.666** 0.606** 0.634** 0.635** 0.637** 
 (0.364) (0.373) (0.357) (0.374) (0.343) (0.327) (0.330) (0.329) (0.300) (0.286) (0.287) (0.288) 
growth -0.013 -0.043 -0.057 -0.045 -0.039 -0.014 -0.020 -0.012 -0.016 0.008 0.010 0.009 
 (0.080) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) (0.072) (0.075) (0.078) (0.075) (0.082) (0.087) (0.088) (0.087) 
lnfdi  0.192** 0.513*** 0.189**  -0.643*** -0.438*** -0.672***  -0.558*** -0.557*** -0.592*** 
  (0.094) (0.071) (0.093)  (0.138) (0.113) (0.138)  (0.159) (0.158) (0.160) 
oilbalance 0.105*** 0.081*** 0.095*** 0.082*** 0.440*** 0.448*** 0.451*** 0.450*** 0.448*** 0.451*** 0.448*** 0.450*** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
TT   0.002 0.010**   0.010* 0.005   0.008 0.006 
   (0.006) (0.005)   (0.006) (0.006)   (0.006) (0.006) 
             
Country effects NO NO NO NO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects NO NO NO NO No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,529 2,350 2,329 2,329 2,529 2,350 2,329 2,329 2,529 2,350 2,329 2,329 
R-squared 0.463 0.493 0.477 0.497 0.712 0.723 0.720 0.724 0.723 0.734 0.732 0.734 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 




Table 2. adding fiscal rules – general with all countries 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Regressors            
           
bbalance 0.116*** -0.031 0.098*** 0.082*** 0.104*** 0.099*** 0.110*** -0.051 0.110*** 0.069 
 (0.030) (0.060) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.038) (0.031) (0.063) (0.031) (0.060) 
age_dep_young -0.038 -0.057* -0.044 -0.046 -0.037 -0.037 -0.030 -0.053* -0.030 -0.035 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) 
age_dep_old 0.052 0.084 0.066 0.083 0.101* 0.101* 0.077 0.114* 0.077 0.072 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) 
NFA_GDP 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
popgr -0.889*** -0.884*** -0.878*** -0.885*** -0.885*** -0.884*** -0.891*** -0.883*** -0.887*** -0.880*** 
 (0.217) (0.215) (0.221) (0.220) (0.221) (0.221) (0.219) (0.216) (0.219) (0.219) 
growth -0.150*** -0.139*** -0.153*** -0.155*** -0.153*** -0.152*** -0.150*** -0.136*** -0.151*** -0.148*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
lnfdi -0.600*** -0.606*** -0.562*** -0.575*** -0.585*** -0.585*** -0.594*** -0.591*** -0.595*** -0.595*** 
 (0.143) (0.140) (0.147) (0.148) (0.143) (0.143) (0.144) (0.139) (0.143) (0.142) 
oilbalance 0.435*** 0.438*** 0.431*** 0.434*** 0.436*** 0.436*** 0.437*** 0.439*** 0.432*** 0.435*** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) 
TT -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
FR_1 -1.155*** -0.670*         
 (0.367) (0.361)         
c.FR_1#c.bbalance  0.187***         
  (0.060)         
ER   0.850** 1.102**       
   (0.401) (0.464)       
c.ER#c.bbalance    0.118       
    (0.079)       
RR     0.084 0.119     
     (0.468) (0.470)     
c.RR#c.bbalance      0.018     
      (0.049)     
BBR       -0.769** -0.225   
       (0.375) (0.372)   
c.BBR#c.bbalance        0.211***   
        (0.063)   
DR         -1.006*** -0.804** 
         (0.385) (0.401) 
c.DR#c.bbalance          0.069 
          (0.072) 
           
Observations 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 
R-squared 0.757 0.759 0.756 0.756 0.755 0.755 0.756 0.759 0.757 0.757 
 
Note: Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. “FR_1” if a country has at least one fiscal rule; “ER” = expenditure rule in place; “RR” revenue 
rule in place; “DR” = debt rule in place; “BBR” = budget balance rule in place   
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Table 3. Fiscal rules, going more granular into specific characteristics 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Regressors            
           
bbalance 0.170*** 0.190*** 0.159*** 0.162*** 0.185** 0.178** 0.167*** 0.162*** 0.163*** 0.169*** 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.050) (0.052) (0.073) (0.074) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) 
age_dep_young -0.040 -0.039 0.007 0.007 -0.021 -0.030 -0.018 -0.013 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.034) (0.048) (0.049) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) 
age_dep_old 0.151** 0.155** 0.054 0.053 0.182** 0.184*** 0.102* 0.101* 0.068 0.073 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.059) (0.059) (0.071) (0.071) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) 
NFA_GDP 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
popgr -0.813*** -0.812*** -0.891*** -0.887*** -0.814 -0.810 -0.888*** -0.885*** -0.894*** -0.894*** 
 (0.240) (0.242) (0.235) (0.236) (0.546) (0.544) (0.233) (0.233) (0.234) (0.234) 
growth -0.158*** -0.148*** -0.144*** -0.143*** -0.189*** -0.191*** -0.146*** -0.148*** -0.144*** -0.142*** 
 (0.047) (0.049) (0.046) (0.046) (0.069) (0.069) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) 
lnfdi -0.665*** -0.619*** -0.502*** -0.502*** -0.520** -0.520** -0.533*** -0.536*** -0.540*** -0.540*** 
 (0.167) (0.164) (0.156) (0.156) (0.211) (0.211) (0.161) (0.161) (0.160) (0.160) 
oilbalance 0.442*** 0.438*** 0.441*** 0.440*** 0.416*** 0.417*** 0.442*** 0.442*** 0.446*** 0.446*** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.064) (0.065) (0.088) (0.088) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.063) 
TT 0.017** 0.019** 0.010 0.010 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
FR_monitor 0.456 -0.356         
 (0.416) (0.509)         
c.FR_monitor#c.bbalance  -0.495***         
  (0.144)         
FR_enforce   1.075*** 1.004**       
   (0.384) (0.404)       
c.FR_enforce#c.bbalance    -0.040       
    (0.076)       
FR_escape     -0.865 -0.182     
     (0.759) (0.801)     
c.FR_escape#c.bbalance      0.386***     
      (0.118)     
Independent_monitor       0.348 0.859*   
       (0.414) (0.464)   
c.Independent_monitor#c.bbalance        0.226**   
        (0.100)   
Transparency         -0.713** -1.017*** 
         (0.320) (0.356) 
c.Transparency#c.bbalance          -0.117* 
          (0.062) 
           
Observations 1,191 1,191 1,451 1,451 913 913 1,427 1,427 1,451 1,451 
R-squared 0.730 0.734 0.740 0.740 0.642 0.643 0.742 0.742 0.739 0.740 
 
Note: Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. “monitor” = at least one of the rules in place monitor compliance exist; “enforce” = at least 






Table 4. Budget Institutions (data from Gupta and Ylaoutinen, 2014 IMF WP) 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Regressors           
          
bbalance 0.720*** 0.567*** 0.361*** 0.414* 0.670*** 0.581* 0.544*** 0.731*** 1.128*** 
 (0.167) (0.132) (0.098) (0.232) (0.145) (0.310) (0.126) (0.175) (0.333) 
age_dep_young -0.121 -0.125 -0.134* -0.149* -0.123 -0.143* -0.124 -0.127 -0.127 
 (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) (0.081) (0.083) (0.082) (0.081) (0.082) 
age_dep_old 0.465*** 0.480*** 0.494*** 0.520*** 0.524*** 0.489*** 0.467*** 0.484*** 0.476*** 
 (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.107) (0.115) (0.109) (0.107) (0.110) 
NFA_GDP 0.032* 0.032 0.033 0.031 0.033* 0.029 0.033* 0.031 0.031 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
popgr -0.970 -0.887 -0.737 -0.668 -0.968 -0.764 -0.877 -0.909 -0.936 
 (0.734) (0.745) (0.760) (0.775) (0.732) (0.784) (0.745) (0.737) (0.758) 
growth -0.081 -0.094 -0.101 -0.099 -0.076 -0.085 -0.093 -0.079 -0.083 
 (0.071) (0.073) (0.076) (0.078) (0.070) (0.074) (0.073) (0.071) (0.072) 
lnfdi -0.554** -0.561** -0.555** -0.546** -0.542** -0.538** -0.558** -0.555** -0.533** 
 (0.264) (0.267) (0.268) (0.265) (0.264) (0.273) (0.267) (0.264) (0.268) 
oilbalance 0.407*** 0.421*** 0.424*** 0.441*** 0.409*** 0.436*** 0.414*** 0.416*** 0.419*** 
 (0.045) (0.046) (0.049) (0.047) (0.046) (0.048) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) 
TT 0.059*** 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.069*** 0.062*** 0.066*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.064*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
fr -9.648***         
 (2.196)         
c.fr#c.bbalance -0.378***         
 (0.103)         
mf  -4.675***        
  (1.065)        
c.mf#c.bbalance  -0.277***        
  (0.083)        
ifa   -5.065***       
   (1.205)       
c.ifa#c.bbalance   -0.176**       
   (0.080)       
fo    -4.249***      
    (1.246)      
c.fo#c.bbalance    -0.119      
    (0.165)      
mbf     -6.775***     
     (1.495)     
c.mbf#c.bbalance     -0.416***     
     (0.104)     
be      26.321***    
      (7.517)    
c.be#c.bbalance      -0.243    
      (0.215)    
understanding       -5.786***   
       (1.289)   
c.understanding#c.bbalance       -0.314***   
       (0.089)   
developing        -8.317***  
        (1.914)  
c.developing#c.bbalance        -0.446***  
        (0.128)  
implementing         -56.668*** 
         (15.308) 
c.implementing#c.bbalance         -0.664*** 
         (0.230) 
          
Observations 537 537 537 537 537 537 537 537 537 
R-squared 0.796 0.793 0.789 0.788 0.796 0.788 0.793 0.795 0.792 
 
Note: Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. “fr”=fiscal reporting; “mf”=macro fiscal forecasting; “IFA”=independent fiscal agency; “fo” 
fiscal objectives; “MBF” medium term budget framework; “be” budget execution; 
“understanding”=understanding the scale and scope of the fiscal challenge; “developing” = developing a credible 






Table 5. by income group, baseline with fiscal rules 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income group AE EME LIC 
Regressors              
bbalance 0.087** 0.128*** -0.034 0.024 0.017 0.008 0.109 0.136 0.097** 0.033 -0.253 -0.230 
 (0.044) (0.042) (0.077) (0.056) (0.109) (0.106) (0.102) (0.094) (0.049) (0.087) (0.266) (0.225) 
age_dep_young 0.314*** 0.342*** 0.341*** 0.372*** -0.160*** -0.123** -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.168* -0.166* -0.151* -0.228** 
 (0.069) (0.071) (0.070) (0.068) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.087) (0.086) (0.088) (0.106) 
age_dep_old 0.239*** 0.231*** 0.295*** 0.240*** -0.023 -0.011 -0.003 -0.061 0.935 1.592 0.754 0.662 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) (0.081) (0.232) (0.237) (0.228) (0.224) (1.521) (1.750) (1.351) (1.360) 
NFA_GDP 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.063** 0.057* 0.060* 0.067** 0.344*** 0.359*** 0.310*** 0.318*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.078) (0.079) (0.080) (0.078) 
popgr -0.600** -0.558* -0.613** -0.610** -0.968*** -0.974*** -0.994*** -0.988*** -0.720* -0.740* -0.716* -0.751* 
 (0.297) (0.304) (0.311) (0.293) (0.305) (0.302) (0.303) (0.304) (0.414) (0.399) (0.403) (0.403) 
growth 0.048 0.044 0.032 0.041 -0.153** -0.133** -0.160*** -0.165*** -0.231** -0.219** -0.208** -0.213** 
 (0.079) (0.080) (0.078) (0.076) (0.062) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) (0.089) (0.086) (0.092) (0.092) 
lnfdi -0.069 -0.043 -0.038 -0.044 -1.575*** -1.528*** -1.515*** -1.479*** -1.030* -1.008* -0.962* -0.989** 
 (0.132) (0.132) (0.127) (0.127) (0.222) (0.215) (0.209) (0.211) (0.552) (0.528) (0.490) (0.501) 
oilbalance 0.687*** 0.686*** 0.663*** 0.700*** 0.286*** 0.292*** 0.282*** 0.271*** 0.438*** 0.459*** 0.454*** 0.460*** 
 (0.050) (0.052) (0.049) (0.052) (0.039) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.131) (0.139) (0.134) (0.134) 
TT 0.011 0.001 0.005 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.010 0.014* -0.016** -0.016* -0.012 -0.013* 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
ER 0.933*    -0.824    2.838    
 (0.528)    (0.634)    (1.859)    
c.ER#c.bbalance 0.116    -0.019        
 (0.082)    (0.165)        
RR  0.583    3.663***    2.997   
  (0.530)    (0.833)    (2.385)   
c.RR#c.bbalance  -0.166*    -0.549**    0.106   
  (0.099)    (0.237)    (0.093)   
BBR   1.840***    -1.127**    -2.286*  
   (0.436)    (0.480)    (1.354)  
c.BBR#c.bbalance   0.173**    -0.202**    0.411  
   (0.077)    (0.092)    (0.284)  
DR    1.750***    -1.187    -2.760* 
    (0.465)    (0.770)    (1.637) 
c.DR#c.bbalance    0.198***    -0.438***    0.409* 
    (0.076)    (0.151)    (0.247) 
co.ER#co.bbalance         0.000    
         (0.000)    
             
Observations 736 736 736 736 402 402 402 402 255 255 255 255 
R-squared 0.841 0.841 0.845 0.845 0.731 0.735 0.735 0.740 0.684 0.689 0.696 0.699 




Table 6. Robustness general fiscal rule – different estimators, all countries 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimator LSDV System GMM CCEP Outlier-robust OLS: |CA|<+-
15% GDP 
Regressors       
Bbalance -0.020 0.075** 0.165 0.205*** -0.038 
 (0.042) (0.030) (0.112) (0.067) (0.054) 
age_dep_young -0.029 -0.038 -0.193*** -0.067*** -0.034 
 (0.030) (0.047) (0.020) (0.010) (0.028) 
age_dep_old 0.088 0.331*** -0.534*** 0.023 0.153*** 
 (0.097) (0.068) (0.071) (0.024) (0.058) 
NFA_GDP 0.007 0.020*** 0.068*** 0.056*** 0.031*** 
 (0.010) (0.001) (0.009) (0.021) (0.007) 
popgr -0.351*** -0.778*** 0.243 0.191 -0.742*** 
 (0.085) (0.135) (0.232) (0.178) (0.170) 
growth -0.135*** -0.068*** -0.279*** -0.265*** -0.098** 
 (0.027) (0.009) (0.060) (0.040) (0.039) 
lnfdi -0.230* -0.628*** -0.245  -0.406*** 
 (0.141) (0.037) (0.155)  (0.097) 
oilbalance 0.296*** 0.494*** 0.185***  0.341*** 
 (0.024) (0.020) (0.019)  (0.023) 
TT -0.010 -0.018*** -0.031*** -0.012*** -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) 
FR_1 -0.258 -0.383 -0.286 1.242*** 0.181 
 (0.417) (0.279) (0.646) (0.361) (0.284) 
interaction 0.073 0.073** 0.057 0.435*** 0.170*** 
 (0.073) (0.030) (0.121) (0.081) (0.055) 
Observations 1,408 1,279 1,390 1,526 1,359 
R-squared     0.751 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. 
 
Table 7. Robustness different fiscal rules (plus interaction) one at a time – different estimators, all 
countries  
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimator LSDV System GMM CCEP Outlier-robust OLS: |CA|<+-
15% GDP 
Regressors       
BBR -0.088 -0.392 -0.340 1.174*** 0.305 
 (0.318) (0.267) (0.630) (0.350) (0.277) 
interaction2 0.081 0.099** 0.061 0.395*** 0.156*** 
 (0.060) (0.042) (0.119) (0.081) (0.054) 
Observations 1,390 1,261 1,390 1,526 1,341 
R-squared   0.550  0.751 
ER 0.437 0.638 5.391*** 3.034*** 1.765*** 
 (0.468) (0.432) (0.885) (0.403) (0.348) 
interaction3 0.055 0.018 0.256* 0.380*** 0.202*** 
 (0.100) (0.045) (0.139) (0.089) (0.072) 
Observations 1,390 1,261 1,390 1,526 1,341 
R-squared   0.613  0.755 
RR 0.445 0.050 -0.671 -1.795*** -0.215 
 (0.627) (0.804) (0.881) (0.604) (0.399) 
interaction4 0.053 -0.030 -0.089 -0.376*** -0.014 
 (0.113) (0.030) (0.133) (0.146) (0.049) 
Observations 1,390 1,261 1,390 1,526 1,341 
R-squared   0.576  0.749 
DR 0.275 -0.112 -1.789*** -1.881*** -0.425 
 (0.455) (0.289) (0.663) (0.505) (0.337) 
interaction5 0.085 0.038 -0.279** -0.170 0.002 
 (0.070) (0.034) (0.116) (0.127) (0.054) 
Observations 1,390 1,261 1,390 1,526 1,341 
R-squared   0.585  0.749 
Note: only relevant regressors are shown, remaining controls omitted for reasons of parsimony. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A1. Empirical evidence on the twin deficits hypothesis 
Authors Countries Period Method Results 




and the United 
Kingdom 
1980-2005 VAR analysis Twin deficits hypothesis holds for 
Canada and the UK, but not for 
Australia and the US 
Beetsma et al. 
(2008) 
Panel of 14 EU 
countries 
1970-2004 VAR analysis (public 
spending shock) 
Evidence of twin deficits 




VAR analysis No twin deficits, but “twin divergence” 
Lee et al. (2008) Panel of 54 
countries 
1973-2004 Regression of CA on 
BB 
Estimated coefficient between 0.19 and 
0.32 
Müller (2008) United States 1973Q1-
2005Q3 
VAR analysis (public 
spending shock) 




Panel of 22 
industrialised 
countries (and 11 
EA countries) 
1981-2005 Panel regression of 
CA on BB with a 
government debt-to-
GDP ratio threshold 
Twin deficits up to a government debt-
to-GDP ratio of 90% (80% for the EA); 
Ricardian equivalence above the 
threshold 
Grier and Ye (2009) United States 1948Q1-
2005Q1 
Tests of structural 
break and VAR-
GARCH model 
No twin deficits in the long run ; 
positive effect of a positive BB shock  
on the CA balance in the short run 
Barnes et al. (2010) Panel of 25 OECD 
countries 
1969-2008 Regression of CA on 
BB (various 
specifications) 
Estimated coefficient between 0.31 and 
0.68 
Bluedorn and Leigh 
(2011) 
Panel of 14 OECD 
countries 
1978-2009 Effects of fiscal 
consolidation on CA 
Estimated coefficient: 0.60 (1.3 for a 
sub-sample of 10 EA countries in the 
post-1998 period) 




structural break and 
threshold  
Long-run coefficient: 0.42 
 
Afonso et al. (2013) Various panels 
(from 15 to 36 
countries) 
1970-2007 Panel cointegration  Estimated coefficient from -0.78 
(Spain) to 0.68 (Austria) in the EU15 
panel; 
from -1.89 (Latvia) to 1.35 (Malta) in 
the panel of 36 countries 
Algieri (2013) Italy, Ireland, 















structural break and 
asymmetries (budget 
balance is the 
primary balance) 
The twin deficits hypothesis holds 
except for Italy 
Cerrato et al. (2015) Panel of 14 OECD 
countries 
1968-2000 OLS, 2SLS and 
GMM estimates 
Estimated coefficient is not statistically 
significant 
Badinger et al. 
(2017) 
Panel of 73 
countries 
1985-2012 LSDV and GMM 
estimates 
Estimated coefficient about 0.20 
Up to 0.64 for industrialised countries 
and 0.35 for non-industrialised 
countries 








Long-run coefficient of the fiscal 
balance variable is 0.52 for Greece, 
0.19 for Spain, 0.57 for Portugal and 
0.46 for the panel 
CA: current account balance. BB: budget balance. EU: European Union. EA : Euro Area. 
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Table A2a. Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the baseline estimates – individual samples 
 CA_GDP bbalance age_dep_young age_dep_old NFA_GDP popgr growth lnfdi oilbalance TT 
 Mean -1.666917 -1.844767  54.39053  11.84142  14.80162  1.641615  3.301198  19.22361 -32.67295  106.9336 
 Median -2.046093 -2.342191  48.77303  7.951671  7.467299  1.578431  3.679473  19.33944 -38.05509  100.0000 
 Maximum  106.8358  95.92886  113.7022  43.90859  802.7024  29.87599  80.96367  27.32179  51.01308  1092.743 
 Minimum -242.1881 -151.3092  14.89820  0.873936 -813.5194 -44.86373 -109.8333  2.302585 -74.35222  8.361830 
 Std. Dev.  10.51413  7.705560  25.80627  7.450539  58.53156  1.939979  5.785230  3.035812  20.90373  48.58671 
 Skewness -2.449133 -3.252541  0.319033  0.848379  6.563779 -0.631166 -3.134734 -0.602422  1.651009  6.728779 
 Kurtosis  88.27027  101.8019  1.685638  2.610745  93.15428  92.56247  70.62790  4.988271  5.557582  92.59843 
           
 Sum -6430.965 -5338.755  229256.1  49911.60  54529.18  9660.904  12570.96  109055.6 -117818.7  390628.4 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  426379.4  171773.8  2806372.  233921.4  12617751  22144.54  127416.1  52274.03  1575262.  8621160. 
           
 Observations  3858  2894  4215  4215  3684  5885  3808  5673  3606  3653 
           
Table A2b. Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the baseline estimates – common sample 
 CA_GDP bbalance age_dep_young age_dep_old NFA_GDP popgr growth lnfdi oilbalance TT 
 Mean -1.509207 -1.799342  49.00038  12.88732  16.39874  1.517314  3.810856  20.95454 -32.50501  103.4221 
 Median -1.841950 -2.367202  40.70865  9.281624  9.162629  1.308223  3.895814  21.19267 -38.10017  99.97820 
 Maximum  49.97951  43.30262  106.7060  42.65274  802.7024  29.87599  29.63940  27.32179  51.01308  430.6244 
 Minimum -242.1881 -151.3092  14.89820  0.873936 -111.6654 -44.86373 -54.28316  6.907755 -73.87814  10.71513 
 Std. Dev.  9.868599  6.263402  25.17755  8.006646  54.31671  2.240132  4.218334  2.522443  20.41594  34.95415 
 Skewness -6.191509 -4.474834  0.617726  0.621300  9.965654 -1.112209 -2.054682 -0.579255  1.791940  2.939108 
 Kurtosis  158.6365  148.7744  1.994475  2.132021  123.0002  119.3797  35.18782  3.758498  5.973894  20.74202 
           
 Sum -3514.943 -4190.666  114121.9  30014.56  38192.65  3533.825  8875.483  48803.13 -75704.17  240870.1 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  226722.1  91327.92  1475740.  149239.7  6868309.  11682.35  41425.24  14812.41  970334.7  2844334. 
           
 Observations  2329  2329  2329  2329  2329  2329  2329  2329  2329  2329 







Table A3. Correlations among the variables included in the baseline estimates 
Obs.: 2329 CA_GDP bbalance age_dep_young age_dep_old NFA_GDP popgr growth lnfdi oilbalance TT 
CA_GDP  1.000000          
bbalance  0.616632 1.000000         
age_dep_young  -0.289546 -0.067661 1.000000        
age_dep_old  0.086448 -0.099400 -0.738714 1.000000       
NFA_GDP  0.175098 0.081226 -0.150911 0.064526 1.000000      
popgr  0.257854 0.386603 0.356322 -0.454274 -0.001746 1.000000     
growth  0.119507 0.278404 0.152565 -0.255209 -0.002033 0.271655 1.000000    
lnfdi  0.245482 0.068957 -0.617093 0.469485 0.185471 -0.193224 0.014129 1.000000   
oilbalance  0.409888 0.393436 -0.045449 -0.179185 0.137899 0.192129 0.042819 0.087560 1.000000  
TT  0.044327 0.039397 0.158808 -0.130968 0.015499 0.051924 0.049235 0.056150 0.122044 1.000000 
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Table A4. splitting the sample’s time span halfway, all countries 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Time span Before 1999 After 1999 
         
bbalance 0.044 0.068 0.053 0.069 0.098*** 0.115** 0.030 0.076 
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.066) (0.063) (0.033) (0.052) (0.092) (0.095) 
age_dep_young -0.002 0.031 0.006 0.025 -0.061 -0.046 -0.063 -0.050 
 (0.082) (0.081) (0.085) (0.082) (0.072) (0.072) (0.074) (0.073) 
age_dep_old -0.203 -0.229 -0.297 -0.288 0.189* 0.253** 0.250** 0.245** 
 (0.195) (0.192) (0.190) (0.183) (0.105) (0.109) (0.107) (0.106) 
NFA_GDP 0.093*** 0.099*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.016* 0.015* 0.014 0.014 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
popgr -0.574*** -0.590*** -0.573*** -0.580*** -0.956*** -0.966*** -0.961*** -0.959*** 
 (0.220) (0.224) (0.221) (0.222) (0.313) (0.313) (0.306) (0.308) 
growth -0.155** -0.156** -0.158*** -0.157*** -0.139** -0.132* -0.127* -0.137** 
 (0.060) (0.061) (0.059) (0.060) (0.067) (0.068) (0.066) (0.068) 
lnfdi -0.310* -0.290* -0.288* -0.288* -0.849*** -0.879*** -0.855*** -0.857*** 
 (0.170) (0.171) (0.169) (0.172) (0.163) (0.157) (0.151) (0.150) 
oilbalance 0.466*** 0.466*** 0.464*** 0.465*** 0.495*** 0.500*** 0.507*** 0.503*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.100) (0.099) (0.099) (0.101) 
TT -0.027 -0.024 -0.026 -0.025 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.008 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
ER 1.638***    0.953    
 (0.586)    (0.651)    
c.ER#c.bbalance 0.115    0.016    
 (0.116)    (0.096)    
RR  0.675    1.356*   
  (0.896)    (0.707)   
c.RR#c.bbalance  -0.287**    -0.025   
  (0.133)    (0.055)   
BBR   0.963*    -0.904**  
   (0.520)    (0.419)  
c.BBR#c.bbalance   0.009    0.089  
   (0.100)    (0.084)  
DR    0.424    -0.627 
    (0.590)    (0.621) 
c.DR#c.bbalance    -0.068    0.040 
    (0.099)    (0.096) 
         
Observations 424 424 424 424 984 984 984 984 
R-squared 0.840 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.835 0.835 0.836 0.835 






Table A5. Global Financial Crisis and Twin Deficits Hypothesis, all countries 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Time span Before GFC After GFC 
         
bbalance 0.024 0.028 -0.115* 0.032 0.143* 0.150** 0.192 0.118 
 (0.036) (0.050) (0.070) (0.067) (0.084) (0.074) (0.125) (0.112) 
age_dep_young -0.012 -0.005 -0.034 -0.006 0.505*** 0.555*** 0.555*** 0.553*** 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.056) (0.055) (0.174) (0.171) (0.174) (0.176) 
age_dep_old -0.185 -0.204 -0.165 -0.227* 0.086 0.120 0.131 0.110 
 (0.127) (0.143) (0.127) (0.119) (0.188) (0.198) (0.195) (0.196) 
NFA_GDP 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.017 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
popgr -0.899*** -0.899*** -0.889*** -0.896*** -0.756** -0.804** -0.788** -0.800** 
 (0.268) (0.269) (0.261) (0.262) (0.344) (0.335) (0.332) (0.333) 
growth -0.193*** -0.192*** -0.170*** -0.179*** 0.036 0.042 0.038 0.039 
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.054) (0.053) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) 
lnfdi -0.453** -0.448** -0.470** -0.484** -0.342* -0.412** -0.422** -0.415** 
 (0.209) (0.205) (0.208) (0.211) (0.191) (0.187) (0.190) (0.190) 
oilbalance 0.485*** 0.483*** 0.485*** 0.471*** 0.480*** 0.490*** 0.486*** 0.494*** 
 (0.100) (0.103) (0.098) (0.097) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) 
TT -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 -0.006 -0.015* -0.018** -0.017** -0.016** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
ER 0.502    1.100*    
 (0.505)    (0.684)    
c.ER#c.bbalance 0.055    0.008    
 (0.114)    (0.096)    
RR  -0.294    0.442   
  (0.686)    (1.360)   
c.RR#c.bbalance  0.012    0.139   
  (0.060)    (0.182)   
BBR   -0.506    -0.016  
   (0.503)    (0.785)  
c.BBR#c.bbalance   0.223***    -0.027  
   (0.079)    (0.125)  
DR    -1.652***    -0.640 
    (0.522)    (0.971) 
c.DR#c.bbalance    0.021    0.060 
    (0.086)    (0.120) 
         
Observations 942 942 942 942 466 466 466 466 
R-squared 0.765 0.764 0.769 0.769 0.902 0.901 0.900 0.901 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. 
